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Abstract
We present a simple mechanism that can be implemented in a simple experiment. In a modified
trust game, the allocator can oﬀer to pay the investor to cooperate. The mechanism is successful
at implementing eﬃcient outcomes: participants manage to achieve an eﬃcient outcome, when this
is possible, two—thirds of the time. While these results are encouraging, we find evidence that both
concerns for fairness and motivation crowding out distort the incentives presented in the mechanism.
Keywords: compensation mechanism, side payment, trust game, signaling, crowding out, concerns
for equity, taste for cooperation
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1 Introduction
There is a growing number of studies that examine mechanisms for implementing Pareto eﬃcient outcomes
in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.1 Most previous results of experimental tests of these incentive
schemes were discouraging. We find encouraging new results for the compensation mechanism. This
mechanism has been tested in somewhat complex games, in which the best decisions are not independent
of the beliefs about what strategy might be selected by the other player.2 We look at a simple game,
identify tensions between individual incentives and other motivations that distort incentives, and pin down
what makes the compensation successful or unsuccessful.
∗The British Academy funded the experiment. Severin Weingarten helped to conduct the experimental sessions. Dieter
Balkenborg, Charles Figuières, and Ron Harstad commented insightfully on the project’s goals and objectives. Estelle Midler
provided an idea for future research.
†E-mail address: juergenbracht@gmail.com (Juergen Bracht)
1See Moore and Repullo (1988) for a theoretical examination of implementability in subgame perfect equilibria.
2See Andreoni and Varian (1999) and Charness et al (2007) for tests in Prisoner’s Dilemmas, Bracht et al. (2008) for a
test in a public goods environment, and Chen and Gazzale (2004) for a game from the literature on solutions to externalities.
These papers analyze games with multiple stages with the players choosing simultaneously in the final stage. These types of
games make drawing inferences from observed actions very diﬃcult. See Section 5.3. for a discussion of the related literature
on the compensation mechanism.
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In the trust game, one player, the investor, has the choice of investing or not investing in a project
that is administered by the other player, the allocator. The investment is always successful: the amount
invested multiplies in value. However, the allocator controls the proceeds of investment: he may keep
the total amount for himself or split it evenly with the investor (Berg et al. (1995)). The economist’s
prediction for this game is that a selfish allocator will always keep all proceeds from an investment rather
than share with the investor. A selfish investor who understands the allocator’s situation knows that any
investment will be lost, and so will choose not to invest. However, both investor and allocator are better
oﬀ if the investor sends the money and the allocator returns the fair share.3
Social scientists across many disciplines have found trust games helpful in thinking about phenomena
ranging from the strength of political institutions to the eﬀectiveness and sustainability of development
projects.
We look for an institution to change the game from a social dilemma to a game in which cooperation is
sustainable as an equilibrium. We add another stage, a contracting stage, to the trust game in which the
allocator can make a binding commitment to pay the investor some amount if she chooses to invest.4 The
idea is straightforward: in the mechanism, subgame perfect equilibria are Pareto eﬃcient. The equilibria
imply a transfer from the allocator to the investor. The amount of the transfer is at least as large as the
amount the investor would receive if she were not to invest.
Coase (1960) presents an example similar to our game: a rancher’s cattle stray onto the farmer’s
property and damage the crops. Coase argues that the eﬃcient outcome will result because the farmer
would have an incentive to pay the rancher to reduce the number of straying cattle.
We show that the mechanism was largely successful at increasing eﬃciency, and that the participants
played reasonably close to the subgame perfect equilibrium, with qualifications. On the other hand, many
experimental researchers have found that behavioral theories can characterize aspects of decisions that
standard theory cannot. So, we also examine a few behavioral sources of hypotheses. According to
taste for cooperation (Palfrey and Rosenthal (1988)), individuals have a natural tendency to be nice. We
also consider fairness theory (Prasnikar and Roth (1992)), according to which individuals dislike unequal
payoﬀs. According to crowding out (Deci (1971)), some individuals have an inherent tendency toward
cooperative behavior. This tendency may be damaged by mechanisms providing financial incentives for
such behavior because the introduction of an incentive scheme can repress the expression of altruism. Hence,
mechanisms that provide weak financial incentives (too small to change monetary best responses) lead to
less cooperation than if there had been no mechanism at all–in contrast to the equilibrium prediction
of no eﬀect. At the same time, mechanisms that provide strong financial incentives (strong enough to
change monetary best responses) lead to more cooperation than if there had been no mechanism at all–in
accordance with the equilibrium prediction of an eﬀect. We also consider a signaling theory (Bracht and
Feltovich (2008)), according to which a choice by the allocator of the largest possible oﬀer amount is a signal
3We use terms such as theoretical prediction, equilibrium prediction, or prediction of game theory to mean the combination
of appropriate equilibrium concepts (usually subgame perfect equilibrium) and the assumption that preferences concern only
players’ own monetary payoﬀs. We acknowledge that this is an abuse of terminology, as game theory itself makes no assumptions
about what form preferences take; diﬀerent preferences may lead to diﬀerent theoretical predictions.
4The game we look at is modeled after work by Varian, regarding preplay contracting. The term compensation mechanism
was introduced by Varian (1994a,b).
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that the allocator intends to split the proceeds of investment. Think of signaling as a good will gesture by
allocators. Consequently, behavior following a given oﬀer amount should depend to some extent on which
other amounts were permitted; specifically, investment (if investors interpret this behavior as signals) and
splitting (if allocators actually are signaling) will be higher when the oﬀer amount is the highest possible.
We see some systematic deviations from our predicted equilibrium, but this behavior is consistent with
participants trying to signal cooperative intentions similar to those observed in other experiments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the new game. Section 3 presents
the experimental design. Section 4 discusses the hypotheses. Section 5 describes the results and discusses
findings of the related literature. Section 6 concludes.
2 Pay for Invest
We begin by describing the exact form of our three-stage game, which we call Pay for Invest. Figure
1 shows a standard trust game with two players (investor, allocator). We introduce a prior stage to this
game where the allocator can announce a number, indicating the amount that he will pay the investor if
she chooses Invest. This announcement is binding: once the allocator oﬀers a contract, he is obligated to
carry it out. Figure 2 shows the subgame of the Pay for Invest after a side payment of s is chosen.
Figure 1: The basic trust game.sInvestor©©©©©©Not Invest
HHHHHH
Invests
(2,0)
sAllocator©©©©©©Splits
(4,4)
HHHHHH
Keep s
(0,8)
Figure 2: Subgame of the Pay to Invest after side payment s is chosen.sInvestor©©©©©©Not Invest
HHHHHH
Invests
(2,0)
sAllocator©©©©©©Splits
(4+s,4-s)
HHHHHH
Keep s
(0+s,8-s)
Let us calculate the subgame perfect equilibrium of such a game. The minimal payment that would
induce the investor to cooperate is 2. If this payment is announced, i.e., s = 2, then the subgame is
transformed (Figure 3). It is clear that s = 2, followed by Invest and Keep, is the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium of the Pay for Invest.5
5 Indeed, the allocator will always choose Keep after investment as 8 − s > 4 − s ⇔ 8 > 4, the investor will invest if and
only if she is oﬀered a good side payment, i.e., s ≥ 2, and the allocator will choose s = 2.
3
Figure 3: Subgame of the Pay to Invest after side payment s = 2 is chosen.sInvestor©©©©©©Not Invest
HHHHHH
Invests
(2,0)
sAllocator©©©©©©Splits
(6,2)
HHHHHH
Keep s
(2,6)
In the experimental game that we consider, the side payments are restricted to being integers. This
restriction adds a new subgame perfect equilibrium to the game, namely, one where the allocator pays one
unit more than the break-even announcement, i.e., s = 3. In the subgame following this oﬀer of a side
payment, it is still a dominant strategy for the allocator to choose Keep after investment. This equilibrium
is supported by the pessimistic expectations that if the investor is indiﬀerent between her two strategies
she will choose not to cooperate. The other equilibrium is supported by the optimistic expectations that
if the investor is indiﬀerent between Invest and Not Invest, she will choose Invest.
3 Experiment
Our experiment was run on a computer network (Fischbacher (2007)). Instructions used in the experiment
are presented in the Appendix. To give the mechanism the greatest challenge, we ran first 5 rounds of
the basic trust game with each participant randomly reassigned a diﬀerent counterpart each time. As
is commonly observed, the participants started out cooperating but soon switched to defecting. By the
final round, most participants were playing the noncooperative strategy. We then switched to the new
game, Pay for Invest. In this game, each allocator names an amount that he will pay the investor if the
investor chooses to invest. Once the allocator has committed to his payments, the amount is revealed to
the investor. We repeated the Pay for Invest for 10 rounds. We consider four treatments, diﬀering in
S. In our control treatment side0, no side payment is possible (S = {0}). In our side3210, side210, and
side10 treatments, S = {3, 2, 1, 0}, S = {2, 1, 0}, and S = {1, 0}, respectively.
Altogether, participants played a total of 15 rounds, 5 in the basic game and 10 in Pay for Invest. We
conducted 13 sessions in all, using 240 participants, with 60 participants per treatment.6 After each round,
participants were reassigned to a diﬀerent participant in the other group. Each session of the experiment
was completed within 1 hour, and participants earned around £11 (including a £5 payment for showing
up). We recruited participants with an online recruiting system.
6The data from the control treatment is from Bracht and Feltovich (2008). The control treatment side0 has 3 sessions with
20 participants in each session; the treatment side01 has 4 sessions with 14, 20, 14, and 12 participants; the treatment side210
has 3 sessions with 14, 14, and 28 participants; the treatment side3210 has 3 sessions with 20, 22, and 18 participants. The
sessions for the new treatments were conducted at the economics laboratory at the University of Aberdeen Business School.
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4 Hypotheses
The theoretical observations lead to the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 The frequency of Invest will be higher following an oﬀer amount of 3 or 2 than following
an oﬀer amount of 1 or 0.
Hypothesis 2 The frequency of Invest will be the same following an oﬀer amount of 1 and 0.
Hypothesis 3 The frequency of Split will be the same following any oﬀer amount.
While these predictions are clear, there is some reason to think the actual impact of the compensation
mechanism might be diﬀerent.
Individuals may have a natural desire to be nice,7 a hypothesis that has received a fair amount of
support in prior experiments.8 If the investor transfers 2 units to the allocator, then the allocator gets
8 units. This implies a cost of cooperation of 1/4. However, if the allocator transfers 4 units, then the
investor gets 4 units. This implies a cost of cooperation of 1. Hence, if there is a utility from seeing someone
else’s satisfaction increased, we may expect more cooperation from investors than from allocators. This
motive gives rise to the conjecture that the propensity to cooperate diﬀers across the two types of players.
Furthermore, if there is a utility component in cooperation above and beyond the monetary gain, then
an announcement of an oﬀer amount of 1 might suﬃce to tempt the investor to invest. Hence, the allocator
may not need to buy out the investor entirely in order to induce such investment. This leads us to replace
hypotheses 1 and 2 with hypothesis 4.
Hypothesis 4 The frequency of Invest will be higher following an oﬀer of a side payment of 3 or 2 or 1
than following no side payment.
Individuals may have a natural taste for fairness,9 a hypothesis that has received a fair degree of
support in prior experiments.10 If an oﬀer of a side payment of 2 is announced, then the investor invests
and the allocator keeps the return of investment. In such an equilibrium, the allocator’s payoﬀ is 6, and
the investor’s payoﬀ is 2. Now, the investor might envy the allocator’s fortune, and may prefer not to
invest if only oﬀered such a break-even amount (resulting in an investor’s payoﬀ of 2 and an allocator’s
7We may reformulate this cooperation motive in the language of utility theory: the welfare of each individual depends
not only on her utility but also on her contributions to the utility of others. She derives a utility from seeing someone else’s
satisfaction increased.
8 In the economics literature, see Arrow (1972) for a discussion of eﬀects of subtle forms of giving on the allocation of
economic resources, Andreoni and Miller (2002) for general tastes for giving, Palfrey and Rosenthal (1988) for a discussion of
social dilemmas, Andreoni and Miller (1993) on the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Andreoni (1995), and Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997)
on public goods.
9We may reformulate this fairness motive in the language of utility theory: the welfare of each individual will depend
both on her own satisfaction and on the satisfaction obtained by the other. We have in mind both a positive relation, one of
altruism, and a negative relation, one of envy.
10For early evidence from economists that participants dislike unequal payoﬀs see Prasnikar and Roth (1992) or Andreoni,
Brown, and Vesterlund (1999).
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payoﬀ of 0). This motive gives rise to the conjecture that an announcement of an oﬀer amount of 2 might
be ineﬀective in increasing investment. This leads us to modify hypotheses 1 and 2, and replace them with
hypothesis 5.
Hypothesis 5 The frequency of Invest will be higher following an oﬀer of a side payment of 3 than
following an oﬀer of 2 or 1 or no oﬀer.
Individuals may have an inherent tendency toward cooperation, which is damaged by a mechanism
that provides financial incentives for such behavior.11 This phenomenon— crowding out — is often seen in
games like ours.12 We consider the following interpretation of the notion of crowding out. In our control
treatment- where no external rules are imposed- levels of investment and splitting ought to be higher than
theory predicts. In our side10 treatment, the rules are not strong enough to make Invest rational, and
levels of cooperation ought to be as theory predicts. Hence, cooperation levels should be less in the side10
treatment than in the control treatment. This leads us to modify hypotheses 2 and 3, and replace them
with hypotheses 6 and 7.
Hypothesis 6 The frequency of Invest will be higher in the control treatment than in each of the other
treatments following an oﬀer amount of 1 or 0.
Hypothesis 7 The frequency of Split will be higher in the control treatment than in the other treatments
following an oﬀer amount of a side payment of 1 or 0.
In our side210 and side3210 treatments, the rules are strong enough to make Invest rational, so there
should be high levels of investment and low levels of splitting. Hence, the frequency of Split will be higher
in the control treatment than in the other treatments following an oﬀer amount of 3 or 2. This leads us to
add hypothesis 8 (while keeping hypotheses 1, 6, and 7).
Hypothesis 8 The frequency of Split will be higher in the control treatment than in the other treatments
following an oﬀer of a side payment of 3 (2) or 0.
Individuals may try to signal cooperative intentions. This phenomenon— signaling — is seen in games
like ours.13 We consider the following interpretation of the notion of signaling. Allocators who intend to
Split will signal their cooperative intention by oﬀering the maximum possible side payment amount. In the
control treatment, there is no opportunity for signaling. In the side10 treatment, however, such signaling
would imply that an oﬀer amount of 1 leads to more cooperation: investors will anticipate that allocators
intend to choose Split, and choose Invest; allocators will follow through and, indeed, choose Split. Thus,
other things equal, cooperation should be more likely when the oﬀer amount chosen by the allocator is
the largest oﬀer amount possible. This leads us to modify hypotheses 2 and 3, and replace them with
hypotheses 9, 10, 11, and 12 (while keeping hypothesis 1).
11For discussions of crowding out and its implications, see Deci (1971), Arrow (1972), Kreps (1997), Frey (1997), and Ostrom
(2000).
12See Fehr and Rockenbach (2003), Fehr and List (2004), Andreoni (2005), and Bracht and Feltovich (2008) for evidence of
crowding out in trust games.
13See Bracht and Feltovich (2008) for evidence of signaling in the escrow game.
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Hypothesis 9 In the side10 treatment, the frequency of Invest will be higher following an oﬀer amount
of 1 than following an oﬀer amount of 0.
Hypothesis 10 In the side10 treatment, the frequency of Split will be higher following an oﬀer amount
of 1 than following an oﬀer amount of 0.
Hypothesis 11 Following an oﬀer amount of 1, the frequency of Invest will be higher in the side10
treatment than in the side210 treatment or the side3210 treatment.
Hypothesis 12 Following an oﬀer amount of 1, the frequency of Split will be higher in the side10 treatment
than in the side210 treatment or the side3210 treatment.
5 Results
Figure 4 shows the fraction of participants choosing to cooperate over all 15 iterations of the game. In
rounds 1 − 5, which are just the standard trust game, 58.3% of investor decisions are cooperative, which
declines to 32.5% in the final round; 46.3% of allocator decisions are cooperative, which declines to 6.7%
in the final round.1415
Now, look at rounds 6 − 15. In the second phase of the control treatment, the frequency of Invest
jumps sharply upward.16 In the three new treatments, the corresponding frequencies also jump upward,
though it is unclear whether this is also a restart eﬀect or the result of change in the game. Despite those
similarities in Invest frequencies in round 6, the frequencies diverge quickly: in the control treatment, the
frequency initially drops rapidly and then stays around 1/3; in the side10 treatment, the frequency stays
around 1/2, drops in the final two rounds but stays above 1/5; in the side210 treatment, the frequency
stays around 1/2; in contrast, in the side3210 treatment, the frequency jumps upward, steadily increases,
and reaches 4/5 in the final rounds.
In the second phase of the control treatment, the frequency of Split jumps upward and stays around
2/5 with variations; in the side10 treatment, the frequency jumps upward as well and stays at a sizeable
level at 1/3 with variations; in both the side210 and side3210 treatments, the frequency starts at a low
level, declines slightly and stays somewhere around 1/10 with variations.
Table 1 reports the frequency of Invest and Split on data from the first phase (Rounds 1 − 5) and
the second phase (Rounds 6 − 15) of the experiment, aggregated over participants and rounds. We find
14The data from the first phase show evidence of the cooperation motive. This motive implies that investor cooperative
behavior should be more frequent than allocator cooperative behavior. When we test for diﬀerences in the propensity to
cooperate in the first half across the two types of players, investors and allocators, we find that the diﬀerence is statistically
significant (z = 2.231, p value ≈ 0.026 over 5 rounds; z = 1.946, p value ≈ 0.052 in the final round).
15We test for diﬀerences in behavior between treatments on session-level data from the control phase. A Chi-square test
rejects the null hypothesis that frequencies of Invest in periods 1 − 5 are equal across the four cells (χ2 = 8.9143, df = 3,
p ≈ 0.030). A Chi-square tests fails to reject the null hypothesis that frequencies of Split in periods 1 − 5 are equal across
the four cells (χ2 = 5.6597, df = 3, p ≈ 0.129). Hence, we found diﬀerences in behavior between treatments on data from the
control phase (where there should be none). In this section, we abstract from those individual diﬀerences.
16One sees this restart eﬀect (Andreoni (1988)), even though no feature of the game has changed.
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Figure 4: Participant behavior in each round; control and treatments.
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that, across all sessions in the second phase of the control treatment (i.e., the repetition of the basic trust
game), the frequency of both Invest and Split is around 40%.17 We now assess the impact of each of the
three new treatments by analyzing the diﬀerence in the frequency of the cooperative action (Invest and
Split) between the control treatment and the new treatments. During the entire second half, 49.7% of
investor moves in the side10 treatment are cooperative; 55.7% of investor moves in the side210 treatment
are cooperative; and 69.3% of investor moves in the side3210 treatment are cooperative. During the second
half, 33.6% of allocator moves in the side10 treatment are cooperative; 13.2% of allocator moves in the
side210 treatment are cooperative; 13.5% of allocator moves in the side3210 treatment are cooperative.18
We now report results of conventional Wilcoxon rank-sum tests of the hypothesis that two independent
samples are from populations of the same distribution.19 The test of the cooperative action Invest shows no
diﬀerence between the control treatment and the side10 treatments (z = −1.061, p value > 0.2888). The
test of Invest shows no diﬀerence between the control treatment and the side210 treatments (z = −1.091,
p value > 0.2752). The test of Invest shows a significant diﬀerence between the control treatment and
the side3210 treatments (z = −1.964, p value > 0.0495). The test of Invest shows no diﬀerence between
the side10 and the side210 treatments (z = −0.707, p value > 0.4795). The test of Invest shows a weakly
17The data from the second phase show no evidence of the cooperation motive. This motive implies that investor cooperation
is more frequent than allocator cooperation. We do not find a significant diﬀerence in cooperative behavior in the second half
of the control treatment (z = −0.218, p value 0.827 over 10 rounds; z = −1.107, p value ≈ 0.268 in the final round).
18The data show some evidence of crowding out. Crowding out implies that cooperation should be less frequent when
mechanism side10 is imposed than when there is no mechanism. In fact, the overall frequency of Invest is 49.7% and the
overall frequency of Split is 33.6%, one higher and one lower than their counterparts in the control treatment.
19We follow the convention that a p value of 1% or less indicates a highly significant diﬀerence, a p value between 1% and
5% indicates a significant diﬀerence, and a p value between 5% and 10% indicates a weakly significant diﬀerence.
In the nonparametric tests, sessions are treated as individual observations.
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Table 1: How eﬀective are the treatments?
Frequency of Invest Frequency of Split
Treatment Rounds 1—5 Rounds 6—15 Rounds 1—5 Rounds 6—15
side0 0.5667 (85/150) 0.4000 (120/300) 0.3765 (32/85) 0.4083 (49/120)
side10 0.6667 (100/150) 0.4967 (149/300) 0.5300 (53/100) 0.3356 (50/149)
side210 0.5000 (75/150) 0.5567 (167/300) 0.4533 (34/75) 0.1317 (22/167)a,b
side3210 0.6000 (90/150) 0.6933 (208/300)a,b,c 0.4778 (43/90) 0.1346 (28/208)a,b
All 0.5833 (350/600) 0.5367 (644/1200) 0.4629 (162/350) 0.2314 (149/644)
a significantly diﬀerent from side0; b sig. diﬀerent from side10; c sig. diﬀerent from side210.
significant diﬀerence between the side10 and the side310 treatments (z = −1.768, p value > 0.0771). The
test of Invest shows a significant diﬀerence between the side210 and the side3210 treatments (z = −1.964,
p value ≈ 0.0495).
The test of the cooperative action Split shows no diﬀerence between the side0 and the side10 treatments
(z = 0.707, p value > 0.4795). The test of Split shows a significant diﬀerence between the side0 and the
side210 treatments (z = 1.964, p value ≈ 0.0495). The tests of Split shows a significant diﬀerence between
the side0 and the side3210 treatments (z = 1.964, p value ≈ 0.0495). The test of Split shows a weakly
significant diﬀerence between the side10 and the side210 treatments (z = 1.768, p value ≈ 0.0771). The
test of Split shows a weakly significant diﬀerence between the side10 and the side310 treatments (z = 1.768,
p value ≈ 0.0771). The test of Split shows a no significant diﬀerence between the side210 and the side3210
treatments (z = 0.218, p value > 0.8273).
Clearly, the mechanism has an overall eﬀect on investor cooperation and eﬃciency when the allocator
is able to make a very good oﬀer of a side payment. But, even when a very good oﬀer is possible,
the mechanism is far from 100% successful. Furthermore, when only a break-even oﬀer is possible, the
mechanism’s success is uncertain. There could be two reasons: allocator participants could be failing to
make the subgame perfect side payments in the first stage, and, when investor participants are oﬀered
good side payments, they fail to respond optimally. We look at the possibilities next.
5.1 Side Payments
Figure 5 shows the time series of the average frequency of allocator oﬀers in each of the three side-payment
treatments; the panel to the left displays side10 with S = {1, 0}, the panel in the middle displays side210
with S = {2, 1, 0}, and the panel to the right displays side3210 with S = {3, 2, 1, 0}. Over the first 5
rounds in treatment side10, the average oﬀer is 0.720, which rises to 0.780 for the final 5 rounds. Over the
first 5 rounds in treatment side210, the average oﬀer is 1.393, which rises to 1.607 for the final 5 rounds.
Over the first 5 rounds in treatment side3210, the average oﬀer is 1.947, which rises to 2.140 for the final
five rounds.
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Figure 5: Relative frequency of side payments in each side-payment treatment; side10 (left panel), side210
(middle panel), and side3210 (right panel).
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5.2 Conditional Cooperation
Table 2 reports the relative frequencies of the choices of the amount of the side payment, the relative
frequencies of Invest choices— conditioned on the side payment amount— and the relative frequency of
Split choices— conditioned on the side payment amount and given Invest, in the second phase of the
experiment. The table shows these quantities broken down by treatment.
Following the oﬀer amount of 3 in the side3210 treatment, investors invest over 90% of the time; after
investment, allocators split less than 4% of the time; allocators choose the amount of 3 almost half of the
time. When allocators choose a lower amount in side3210, investors frequently invest, though they do
invest more often following an amount of 2 (67% of the time) than after an oﬀer amount of 1 (34% of
the time) or a 0 amount (30% of the time); following investment after a small oﬀer, allocators split with
frequency between 26% and 47%, depending on the side payment amount.
Following the oﬀer amount of 2 in the side210 treatment, investors invest 70% of the time; after
investment, allocators split less than 8% of the time; allocators choose the amount of 2 almost two-thirds
of the time. When allocators choose a lower amount in side210, investors seldom invest, though they do
invest more often following an amount of 1 (36% of the time) than after a 0 amount (23% of the time);
following investment after a small oﬀer, allocators split with frequency between 33% and 36%, depending
on the side payment amount.
Following the oﬀer amount of 1 in the side10 treatment, investors invest 56% of the time; after invest-
ment, allocators split more than 39% of the time; allocators choose the amount of 1 three-fourths of the
time. When allocators make no oﬀer in side10, investors invest one-third of the time; following investment
after no oﬀer, allocators split only 4% of the time, depending on the side payment amount.
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Table 2: How rational are participants?
Treatment Side payment Frequency Conditional Conditional
amount chosen frequency- Invest frequency- Split
side0 0 1.000 (300/300) 0.400 (120/300) 0.408 (49/120)
side10 0 0.250 (150/600) 0.320 (48/150) 0.042 (2/48)
1 0.750 (450/600) 0.556 (250/450) 0.392 (98/250)
side210 0 0.133 (80/600) 0.225 (18/80) 0.333 (6/18)
1 0.233 (140/600) 0.357 (50/140) 0.360 (18/50)
2 0.633 (380/600) 0.700 (266/380) 0.075 (20/266)
side3210 0 0.143 (86/600) 0.302 (26/86) 0.308 (8/26)
1 0.147 (88/600) 0.341 (30/88) 0.467 (14/30)
2 0.233 (140/600) 0.671 (94/140) 0.255 (24/94)
3 0.477 (286/600) 0.930 (266/286) 0.037 (10/266)
Note that the levels of Invest and Split depend not only on the side payment amount, but also on
what choices were available. Investment tends to be higher following a given oﬀer decision when that was
the largest possible amount than when it was not. For instance, a 0 amount is the largest possible oﬀer
of a side payment in the side0 treatment, but a larger amount was possible in three other treatments. In
the side0 treatment, the frequency of Invest is 0.40; in the side10 treatment, the frequency of Invest is
0.32; in the side210 treatment, the frequency of Invest is 0.23; in side3210 treatment, the frequency of
Invest is 0.30. A 1 amount is the largest possible amount in the side10 treatment, but a larger amount
was possible in the side210 and side3210 treatments. In fact, the frequency of investment following 1 is
0.56 in the side10 treatment but only 0.36 in the side210 treatment and 0.34 in the side3210 treatment.
A 2 amount is the largest possible amount in the side210 treatment, but a larger amount is possible in
the side3210 treatment. Indeed, the frequency of Invest is 0.70 in the side210 treatment and 0.67 in the
side3210 treatment.
We conclude that the data from investors show strong evidence of signaling. Signaling implies that
Invest should be more frequent when an oﬀer of 1 is made in the side10 treatment than when there is no
oﬀer. Signaling also implies that Invest should be more frequent when an oﬀer of 1 is made in the side10
treatment than in the other treatments in which an oﬀer of 1 is possible.
The pattern does not always hold for allocator. Splitting tends to be higher following a given side
payment decision rather when that is the largest possible amount than when it is not. A 0 amount is the
largest possible oﬀer of a side payment in the side0 treatment, but a larger amount was possible in three
other treatments. Indeed, in the side0 treatment, the frequency of Split is 0.41; in side10, the frequency
is 0.04; in side210, the frequency is 0.33; in side3210, the frequency is 0.31. A 1 amount is the largest
possible amount in the side10 treatment, but a larger amount was possible in the side210 and side3210
treatments; in side10, the frequency of Split is 0.39; in side210, the frequency is 0.36; however, in side3210,
the frequency is 0.47. A 2 amount is the largest possible in the side210 treatment, but a larger amount
is possible in the side3210 treatment; the frequency is 0.08 in side210; however, the frequency is 0.26 in
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side3210. We conclude that the data from allocators show some evidence of signaling.20
The crowding-out theory makes almost the opposite prediction to signaling. Crowding out implies that
Invest should be more frequent in the control treatment than in the other treatments following a low oﬀer
amount of 1 or 0. The frequency of Invest in the control treatment is 0.40. Following a bad oﬀer, the
frequency of Invest is 0.50 in side10, 0.31 in side210, 0.32 in side3210, and 0.42 across side10, side210,
and side3210. We conclude that there is no evidence of crowding out for investors.
Crowding out implies that Split should be more frequent in the control treatment than in side10,
side210, and side3210 following a bad oﬀer. The frequency of Split in the control treatment is 0.41.
Following a bad oﬀer, the frequency of Split is 0.34 in side10, 0.35 in side210, 0.39 in side3210, and
0.35 across side10, side210, and side3210. We conclude that there is some evidence of crowding out for
allocators.
Figure 6: Conditional frequency of investment in the three side payment treatments side10 (left panel),
side210 (middle panel), and side3210 (right panel).
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Figure 6 shows the time series of average frequency of investor cooperation conditioned on the oﬀer
amounts. The panel to the left shows treatment side10, the panel in the middle shows treatment side210,
and the panel to the right shows side3210. When receiving a good oﬀer over the first 5 rounds in treatment
side210, investor cooperation is 0.77, which falls to 0.65 in the final 5 rounds. When receiving a good oﬀer
over the first 5 rounds in side3210, investor cooperation is 0.79, which rises to 0.90 in the final 5 rounds.
Figure 7 shows the time series of the average frequency of allocator cooperation in the three side
payment treatments side10 (left panel), side210 (middle panel), and side3210 (right panel). When making
a good oﬀer over the first 5 rounds in treatment side210, allocator cooperation is 0.08, which falls to 0.03
20Signaling implies that Split should be more frequent when an oﬀer of 1 is made in the side10 treatment than when there
is no oﬀer. Signaling also implies that Split should be more frequent when an oﬀer of 1 is made in the side10 treatment rather
than in either the side210 treatment or the side3210 treatment.
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in the final 5 rounds. When making a good oﬀer over the first 5 rounds in treatment side3210, allocator
cooperation is 0.11, which falls to 0.06 for the final 5 rounds.
Figure 7: Conditional frequency of splitting in the three side-payment treatments side10 (left panel),
side210 (middle panel), and side3210 (right panel).
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Let us summarize the data: When equilibrium predicts a change across or within treatments, that
change in the predicted direction is seen in the data.21 Consistent with hypothesis 1, investment is more
frequent in the side210 and side3210 treatments following a good oﬀer than after any bad oﬀer in any
treatment. On the other hand, equilibrium does not predict a change across treatments for allocator
behavior given any oﬀer amount. However, inconsistent with hypothesis 3, splitting is less frequent following
a 3 or a 2 amount (given Invest) than following a 1 or 0 amount (given Invest), but splitting is more
frequent following a 1 amount (given Invest) than following a 0 amount (given Invest). Inconsistent with
hypothesis 2 but consistent with hypothesis 4, investment is more frequent following a 1 amount than
following a 0 amount. Hence, the data show some evidence of taste for cooperation. Consistent with
hypothesis 5, investment is more frequent following a 3 amount than following a 2 amount. Hence, the
data show some evidence of taste for fairness.
Second, we have seen evidence that investors believe that allocators signal cooperative intentions by
choosing the largest oﬀer amount possible. Indeed, investment is less frequent in treatment side210 after
a small oﬀer amount than in both side10 and side0 treatments in which only small oﬀer amounts were
possible. Furthermore, while allocators make eﬃcient oﬀers more frequently as play continues, overall in
the side210 treatment, one-third of the actual oﬀer amounts are too low to induce rational investment.
When investors do receive eﬃcient oﬀers, there is some hesitation to invest— even after participants gain
experience—, possibly because of some investor aversion to unfairness.22 Hence, the side210 treatment
21Equilibrium’s point predictions perform poorly; we rarely see levels of investment and splitting close to zero.
22We saw that seven-tenths of invester decisions are uncooperative following an oﬀer amount of 2.
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does not have a significant overall eﬀect on investor cooperation (versus either the side10 treatment or
the side0 treatment). The side3210 treatment performs better than the side210 treatment: in side3210,
allocators learn only slowly to oﬀer the largest possible amount, but when the largest possible amount is
oﬀered, investors invest very frequently (given the usual noise and confusion in experiments). The side10
treatment performs worse than the side210 treatment: In side10, when allocators choose the larger of the
two ineﬃcient oﬀers, investment is encouraged. However, allocators do not oﬀer the amount of 1 frequently
enough, and even following an oﬀer amount of 1, the rate of investment is still well below 100%.
The four models of Table 3 refines our understanding of both treatment eﬀects and cooperation dy-
namics. We look at two samples: the first set includes all observations; the second set is a subset of this
data- which includes observations only if the investor invested. We work with two types of regression
models. The first specification (Short Invest (SI)) looks at investor behavior, and the dependent variable
is an indicator variable for the invest choice. The variable invest takes on the value 1 if the investor invests
and 0 if the investor does not invest. To control for time dependencies, we include the variable round
number (which takes on the values 1, 2, ..., 15, corresponding to the rounds) and an indicator variable for
the second phase of the experiment (value 1 if round number≥ 6 and 0 otherwise). The main explanatory
variables are six pairs: three indicator variables for each treatment (side10, side210, and side3210), three
variables for each oﬀer amount (1, 2, and 3) and the interactions of those variables with the time trend
variable. The second model looks at allocator behavior (Short Split (SS)) and so the dependent variable
is an indicator for the split choice. We use the same set of independent variables. The data is restricted
to the subsample that follows investment by the investor.
Our next two specifications (Long Invest (LI) and Long Split (LS)) are similar to SI and SS, but add
three pairs of variables designed to capture the interaction between the non-control treatments and a 1
oﬀer amount, so that we can assess our crowding-out and signaling hypotheses. The first pair consists
of the product of our side10 and 1 oﬀer amount indicator, and the product of this new variable with the
round number. The other two pairs use the side210 or side310 variables instead of side10. To avoid perfect
collinearity, we remove both the 1 oﬀer amount variable and its product with the round number.
Table 3 shows the results of the four regressions: coeﬃcient estimates, standard errors, value of the
log-likelihood, the pseudo−R2, and the BIC and AIC information criteria.23 These models are not nested,
so we compare them with information criteria. The Bayesian Information Criterion favors the two simpler
models: model specification SI has a BIC of 2075.06 which is lower (and thus better) than the 2098.52
of model specification LI, and model specification SS’s BIC of 1010.89 is better than model specification
LS’s BIC of 1023.87. The Akaike Information Criterion favors the simpler model for investors but the less
simple for allocators: SS has a AIC of 942.26 which is higher and (thus worse) than LS’s 935.64, and SI’s
AIC of 1998.13 is better than LI’s AIC of 1999.60. Because the simpler models tend to fare better under
these criteria, and because comparison of the columns of Table 3 suggests that the results are reasonably
robust to our specification, we will confine our discussion of results to the first two columns— unless we
need the extra variables used in the other columns.24
23These regressions were performed using STATA (version 11), and incorporate individual-subject random eﬀects.
24The two variables of time dependence (round and round number≥ 6) are jointly highly significant for investors (χ2 = 41.56,
df = 2, p ≈ 0.0000) but are not jointly significant at conventional error levels for allocators (χ2 = 2.95, df = 2, p ≈ 0.2282).
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Table 3: Estimates from probit models with random eﬀects (standard error in parentheses)
Model Short Invest (SI) Short Split (SS) Long Invest (LI) Long Split (LS)
Dependent variable Invest Split Invest Split
n = 1800 n = 994 n = 1800 n = 994
cons 0.5898
(0.1949)
∗∗∗ −0.2549
(0.2764)
0.5908
(0.1957)
∗∗∗ −0.2555
(0.2789)
round number −0.1343
(0.0232)
∗∗∗ −0.0604∗
(0.0365)
−0.1352
(0.0232)
∗∗∗ −0.0631∗
(0.0368)
round number≥ 6 0.4644
(0.1809)
∗∗ 0.4513
(0.2939)
0.4732
(0.1812)
∗∗∗ 0.4782
(0.2979)
side10 (treatment) 0.5761
(0.2810)
∗∗ 1.1555∗∗∗
(0.4103)
0.5459
(0.2968)
∗ 1.5216
(0.4513)
∗∗∗
side10*round −0.0781
(0.0284)
∗∗∗ −0.2334∗∗∗
(0.0527)
−0.0859
(0.0318)
∗∗∗ −0.3709
(0.0821)
∗∗∗
side210 (treatment) 0.2395
(0.2854)
0.7941∗
(0.4120)
0.2206
(0.2908)
0.7420
(0.4195)
∗
side210*round −0.1091
(0.0298)
∗∗∗ −0.2043∗∗∗
(0.0534)
−0.0982
(0.0334)
∗∗∗ −0.1702
(0.0590)
∗∗∗
side3210 (treatment) 0.3882
(0.2886)
0.6432
(0.4036)
0.4022
(0.2936)
0.4674
(0.4100)
side3210*round −0.1145
(0.0302)
∗∗∗ −0.1552∗∗∗
(0.0518)
−0.1041
(0.0331)
∗∗∗ −0.0874
(0.0553)
1 (side payment) amount −0.8620
(0.3862)
∗∗ −0.6842
(0.6149)
− −
1 amount*round 0.1495
(0.0388)
∗∗∗ 0.1686
∗∗
(0.0673)
− −
2 (side payment) amount −0.3863
(0.4368)
−1.9347∗∗∗
(0.6718)
−0.3840
(0.4405)
−1.8484∗∗∗
(0.6776)
2 amount*round 0.2139
(0.0436)
∗∗∗ 0.1959∗∗∗
(0.0725)
0.2041
(0.0469)
∗∗∗ 0.1490∗∗∗
(0.0757)
3 (side payment) amount 0.3294
(0.7417)
−0.3355
(1.1788)
0.3275
(0.7442)
−0.2203
(1.2004)
3 amount*round 0.2544∗∗∗
(0.0686)
−0.0658
(0.1356)
0.2439
(0.0699)
∗∗∗ −0.1293
(0.1393)
1 amount*side10 −0.4081
(0.4687)
−0.9155
(0.7243)
1 amount*side10*round 0.1244
(0.0473)
∗∗∗ 0.3026∗∗∗
(0.0979)
1 amount*side210 −1.0454
(0.6557)
−1.8061
(1.1045)
1 amount*side210*round 0.1546
(0.0702)
∗∗ 0.2629∗∗
(0.1184)
1 amount*side3210 −2.2849
(0.8715)
∗∗∗ 2.3396
(2.1199)
1 amount*side3210*round 0.2554
(0.0871)
∗∗∗ −0.2518
(0.2119)
ln(L) −985.0633 −457.1316 −981.7991 −449.8214
pseudo−R2 0.5881 0.1523 0.5895 0.1659
BIC 2075.0642 1010.8875 2098.5180 1023.8741
Akaike 1998.1266 942.2631 1999.5982 935.6428
∗(∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗): Coeﬃcient significant diﬀerent from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) level.
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We estimate the partial eﬀects of the oﬀer amounts on participant choices. The partial eﬀect of, for
instance, a 1 oﬀer amount rather than no oﬀer in round t has the form G(β0+β1 amount+β1 amount∗round+
β3x3 + ... + βkxk) − G(β0 + β3x3 + ... + βkxk) with G being the normal cdf . Figure 8 reports the point
estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals of the partial eﬀects of the expression above (upper left
panel), for each round and for both player types. The figure also shows the corresponding estimates for
both the eﬀect of a 2 oﬀer amount versus no oﬀer (upper center panel) and the eﬀect of a 3 oﬀer amount
versus no oﬀer (upper right panel). Figure 8 also shows the partial eﬀects of a 2 oﬀer amount versus a
1 oﬀer amount (lower left panel), the eﬀects of a 3 oﬀer amount versus a 1 oﬀer amount (lower middle
panel), and the eﬀects of a 3 oﬀer amount versus a 2 oﬀer amount (lower right panel).
The point estimates for the eﬀect of a 3 amount versus a 0 amount are positive for investors. The
corresponding confidence intervals are positive as well. The point and interval estimates for the eﬀect of
a 3 amount versus a 1 oﬀer amount are positive. The point and interval estimates for the eﬀect of a 2
amount versus a 1 oﬀer amount are positive. The point and interval estimates for the eﬀect of a 2 amount
versus a 0 oﬀer amount are positive. Hence, Invest is significantly more likely
1) after a 3 oﬀer amount than after a 0 oﬀer amount,
2) after a 3 oﬀer amount than after a 1 oﬀer amount,
3) after a 2 oﬀer amount than after a 1 oﬀer amount, and
4) after a 2 oﬀer amount than after a no oﬀer.
These four findings are consistent with hypothesis 1. Moreover, the point estimate of the partial eﬀect
tends to grow over the length of the session. The diﬀerences are substantial and become stronger as
participants gain experience.
We also see that Invest is, initially, not significantly more likely after a 1 oﬀer amount than after a
0 oﬀer amount. However, the point estimate of the eﬀect increases over time; it becomes significant after
three rounds. To the extent that this eﬀect is significant following either a 1 or a 0 oﬀer amount, this
finding is at odds with hypothesis 2, according to which frequencies of Invest should be the same following
either a 1 or 0 amount. On the other hand, the finding is consistent with hypothesis 4.
We also see that Invest is significantly more likely after a 3 oﬀer amount than after a 2 oﬀer amount.
However, the point estimate of the eﬀect decreases slowly over time; it becomes significant in the final
The two side10 variables (side10 and side10_round) are jointly significant for investors (χ2 = 7.77, df = 2, p ≈ 0.0229)
and jointly highly significant for allocators (χ2 = 21.61, df = 2, p ≈ 0.0000). The two side210 variables (side210 and
side210_round) are jointly highly significant for both investors (χ2 = 17.20, df = 2, p ≈ 0.0002) and allocators (χ2 = 15.65,
df = 2, p ≈ 0.0004). The two side3210 variables (side3210 and side3210_round) are jointly highly significant for both
investors (χ2 = 16.57, df = 2, p ≈ 0.0003) and allocators (χ2 = 9.39, df = 2, p ≈ 0.0092). The two side_1 variables
(side_1 and side_1_round) are jointly highly significant for both investors (χ2 = 29.48, df = 2, p ≈ 0.0000) and allocators
(χ2 = 12.49, df = 2, p ≈ 0.0019). The two side_2 variables (side_2 and side_2_round) are jointly highly significant for
both investors (χ2 = 128.64, df = 2, p ≈ 0.0000) and allocators (χ2 = 8.57, df = 2, p ≈ 0.0138). The two side_3 variables
(side_3 and side_3_round) are jointly highly significant for both investors (χ2 = 186.33, df = 2, p ≈ 0.0000) and allocators
(χ2 = 5.27, df = 2, p ≈ 0.0716).
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Figure 8: Partial eﬀects of the oﬀer amounts versus no oﬀer on choices; circles represent point estimates;
segments represent 95% confidence intervals.
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three rounds. To the extent that this eﬀect is significant following either a 3 or a 2 oﬀer amount, this
finding is consistent with hypothesis 5, according to which frequencies of Invest should be lower following
an amount of 2 than following an amount of 3.
In Figure 8, we do see large diﬀerences in point and interval estimates of the eﬀects of the oﬀer amounts
on split choices for allocators. The point estimates for the eﬀect of an oﬀer amount of 3 versus an oﬀer
amount of 0 are negative, but the eﬀect, while significant at first, becomes insignificant as participants gain
experience. Similarly, the point estimates for the eﬀect of an oﬀer amount of 2 versus an oﬀer amount of 1
are negative, but the eﬀect, while initially significant, becomes insignificant. The eﬀects of an oﬀer amount
of 3 versus an oﬀer amount of 2 are insignificant. Similarly, the eﬀects of a 2 oﬀer amount versus a 0 oﬀer
amount are insignificant with the exception of the first two rounds. In contrast, the point estimates of the
eﬀect of an oﬀer amount of 3 versus an oﬀer amount of 1 are negative and significant. Furthermore, the
eﬀect increases over the length of the session and becomes substantial. In contrast, the point estimates
of the eﬀect of an oﬀer amount of 1 versus an oﬀer amount of 0 are positive and significant (with the
exception of the first three rounds). Furthermore, the eﬀect increases as participants gain experience and
becomes substantial. These findings, taken together, are inconsistent with Hypothesis 3.
Note also that the larger the diﬀerence in the oﬀer amount, the smaller the partial eﬀects on allocator
choice. For instance, the diﬀerence between oﬀer amount 1 and oﬀer amount 0 is small, and the partial
eﬀect on allocator choice is positive; the diﬀerence between oﬀer amount 3 and oﬀer amount 0 is large, and
the partial eﬀect on allocator choice is negative.
We move to the partial eﬀects of the treatments on participant choices. The partial eﬀect of, for instance,
the side10 treatment rather than the side0 control treatment in round t has the form G(β0 + βside10 +
βside10∗round+β3x3+ ...+βkxk)−G(β0+β3x3+ ...+βkxk) with G being the normal cdf . Figure 9 shows,
for rounds 6− 15 and for both investors and allocators, the estimation results for each of the non-control
treatments (upper panels). Figure 9 also allows us to make pairwise comparisons between treatments
(lower panels).25 The six panels show point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals for the eﬀects.
We see little evidence of crowding out: the point estimates for the eﬀects of each non-control treatment
on allocator choices are negative, but the eﬀects are small and insignificant; the corresponding estimates
for the eﬀect on investor choices are negative (with the exception in the first two rounds of the side10
treatments), but the eﬀects are small and usually insignificant. In addition, we fail to find substantial and
significant diﬀerences in cooperation frequencies between the non-control treatments (with the exception
of the first five rounds in the comparison between the side210 and side10 treatments). Crowding out,
as we defined it, requires that cooperation frequencies should be lower in the control treatment not only
following no oﬀer, but overall— including a 1 oﬀer amount as well. Figure 10 reports this overall partial
eﬀect on frequencies, combining the eﬀect of the treatment, the joint eﬀect of the treatment and a 1 oﬀer
amount, and the observed frequency of the 1 oﬀer amount in the treatment.26 The overall partial eﬀect
of, for instance, the side10 treatment rather than the side0 control treatment in round t has the form
G(β0 + βside10+ βside10∗round + p(1|side10) ∗ β1 oﬀer amount∗side10 + p(1|side10) ∗ β1 oﬀer amount∗side10∗round +
β5x5 + ...+ βkxk)−G(β0 + β5x5 + ...+ βkxk) with G being the normal cdf . Figure 10 shows, for rounds
25The estimation of the eﬀects is based on model specification Short Invest (SI) and Short Split (SS).
26The estimation of the eﬀects is based on model specification Long Invest (LI) and Long Split (LS).
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Figure 9: Partial eﬀects of each of three treatments versus the control treatment on choices (upper pan-
els) and pairwise comparison of non-control treatments (lower panels); circles represent point estimates;
segments represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 10: Is there crowding out? Overall partial eﬀects of each treatment on choices following an oﬀer of
1 or 0; circles represent point estimates; segments represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 11: Is there crowding out? Overall partial eﬀects of the side210 treatment on allocator choices
following an oﬀer of 2 or 0 (left panel) and overall partial eﬀects of the side3210 treatment on choices
following an oﬀer of 3 or 0 (right panel); circles represent point estimates; segments represent 95% confidence
intervals.
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6 − 15 and for both investors and allocators, the estimation results of this overall eﬀect of each of the
non-control treatments on choices. We fail to find substantial and systematic diﬀerences for the treatments
for investors (with the exception of five rounds of the side210 treatment in which the predicted eﬀect is
significantly negative). These results cast doubt on our crowding-out hypothesis 6. We do find systematic
diﬀerences between the treatments for allocators as the point estimates are negative; however, the eﬀects
are not significantly diﬀerent from zero. These results cast some doubt on our crowding-out hypothesis 7.
We now test hypothesis 8. Figure 11 reports the overall partial eﬀect on Split frequencies, combining
the eﬀect of the treatment, the joint eﬀect of the treatment and a 2 (3) oﬀer amount, and the observed
frequency of the 2 (3) oﬀer amount in the treatment.27 Figure 11 shows, for rounds 6−15 and for allocators,
the estimation results of this overall eﬀect of each of the non-control treatments on choices. We do find
systematic diﬀerences between the treatments for allocators as the point estimates are negative however
the eﬀects are significantly diﬀerent from zero in only five instances. These results cast some doubt on our
crowding-out hypothesis 8.
We turn to our signaling hypotheses. Recall that these hypotheses involve interaction between the 1 oﬀer
amount and the side10 treatment. We look at the eﬀect of a 1 oﬀer amount versus no oﬀer, conditional on
the side10 treatment, and at the eﬀect of the side10 treatment versus another non-control treatment, condi-
tional on a 1 oﬀer amount. The partial eﬀect of, for instance, a 1 oﬀer amount rather than no oﬀer in round
t in the side10 treatment, has the form G(β0+β1 oﬀer amount∗side10+β1 oﬀer amount∗side10∗round+ ...+βkxk)−
G(β0 + β3x3 + ...+ βkxk) with G being the normal cdf . The eﬀect of the side10 versus the side210 treat-
ment, conditional on a 1 oﬀer amount, has the form G(β0+β1 oﬀer amount∗side10+β1 oﬀer amount∗side10∗round+
βside10 + βside10∗round + ...+ βkxk) −G(β0 + β1 oﬀer amount∗side210 + β1 oﬀer amount∗side210∗round + βside210 +
βside210∗round + ... + βkxk). Figure 11 shows the estimation results.28 The panel to the left shows the
eﬀect of a 1 oﬀer amount, conditional on the side10 treatment. The eﬀect is initially insignificant but
turns positive, substantial, and significant for both investors and allocators (in this treatment, participants
are more likely to choose cooperation after a 1 oﬀer amount than after a 0 oﬀer amount). The remaining
panels tell a diﬀerent story: there is no persistent increase in the frequency of allocator choices following
1 oﬀer amounts in the side10 rather than in the side210 or the side3210 treatment. For investors, there
is a significant and substantial increase in invest frequencies in early rounds, but this eﬀect declines over
the length of the session, becoming insignificant by the end of the session. We conclude that the evidence
for signaling is mixed. There is little indication of signaling by allocators, but a belief by investors that
allocators are signaling (when they are not).
27The overall partial eﬀect of, for instance, the side210 treatment rather than the side0 treatment in round t has the form
G(β0+βside210+βside210∗round+ p(2|side210) ∗β2 oﬀ er amount∗side210+ p(2|side210) ∗β2 oﬀ er amount∗side210∗round+β5x5+ ...+
βkxk)−G(β0+β5x5+ ...+βkxk) with G being the normal cdf . The estimation of the eﬀects is based on a model specification
similar to LI and LS, replacing the 2 oﬀer amount variable by the 1 oﬀer amount variable, the 2 amount*round variable by
the 1 amount*round variable, the 1 amount ∗side10 by the 2 amount∗side210 variable, and the 1 amount ∗ side10 ∗ round
variable by the 2 amount ∗ side210 ∗ round variable.
28The estimation of the eﬀects is based on model specification Long Invest (LI) and Long Split (LS).
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Figure 12: Is there signaling? Partial eﬀects of selected variables on choices; circles represent point
estimates; segments represent 95% confidence intervals.
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5.3 Discussion
We know of a few experimental studies which evaluate the performance of the compensation mechanism.
Our study is the first investigation of the mechanism in a trust game framework. This is a much simpler
game than the one used in previous studies, but it is still a diﬃcult test case: In our setting, there are
two decision variables for allocators, one decision variable for investors, and backward induction of both
allocators and investors is required. In addition, the multiplicity of equilibria raises a coordination problem.
We assess the overall performance of the mechanism. Then, we isolate causes for the mechanism’s
success and failure by revisiting our series of experimental games.
We find that our mechanism is quite successful, and its performance compares favorably with the
experimental results for other eﬃciency-inducing mechanisms. We saw that 67.00% of the time allocator
participants made oﬀers that should induce cooperation when eﬃcient oﬀers were feasible. Nevertheless,
this oﬀer rate is well below 100%. Furthermore, 77.67% of the time investor participants responded with
cooperation when receiving an eﬃcient oﬀer. Consequently, 62.5% of the time participants managed to
achieve the eﬃcient outcome when that was possible. In contrast, 44.83% of the time participants managed
to achieve the eﬃcient outcome even when it was not possible. In the final round, 68.33% of the time
participants managed to achieve the eﬃcient outcome when it was possible, and only 30.00% of the time
participants managed to achieve the eﬃcient outcome when it was not possible. Thus, the overall eﬀect is
significant, substantial, and sustainable.
We interpret these numbers to show support for the contention that if individuals adjust their behavior
to that of the other player in the game, searching for choices that give them better results, and if they
are able to gain experience in a simple enough environment, then the compensation mechanism works
well. Chen and Gazzale (2004) look carefully at the dynamic properties of a generalized version of the
compensation mechanism. Their game is taken from the literature on externalities and it is a bit more
complicated than ours. They find that supermodular games converge significantly better than those well
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below the threshold for supermodularity. Supermodularity is a technical property of games that ensures
convergence to equilibrium under various learning dynamics.
Andreoni and Varian (1999) assess the compensation mechanism in a prisoner’s dilemma. In their
experiment, participants first play a prisoner’s dilemma, then a modified version. In the modified version,
prior to play, each player chooses how much to oﬀer her opponent in exchange for cooperating, and then each
player is told what she has been oﬀered to cooperate. This mechanism changes the equilibrium to one in
which both players cooperate. Andreoni and Varian do indeed find more cooperation under this mechanism,
but the increase was much smaller than predicted: cooperation was higher than predicted without the
mechanism, but much lower than predicted with the mechanism. The overall frequency of cooperation is
22.9% without and 54.5% with the incentive scheme. Charness et al (2007) assess the mechanism in a series
of prisoner’s dilemma. They confirm Andreoni and Varian’s result: overall cooperation rates are between
10.8% and 17.5% without and 42.9% and 68.1% with the incentive scheme. Both prisoner’s dilemma studies
find no evidence of learning; both suggest that individuals are motivated by fairness.
In our setting, we saw evidence of the presence of investor fairness motives as well (Hypothesis 5; Table
2, Figure 6 (middle panel), Figure 8 (bottom right panel)). Some investor participants seem to be averse
to extremely unequal payoﬀs; this aversion might have lead to more frequent cooperation when the oﬀer
amount is 3 than when the oﬀer amount is 2. However, it seems that this aversion goes away as participants
gain experience (Figure 8, bottom right). Nevertheless, this phenomenon has a negative overall impact on
the eﬀectiveness of the mechanism.
Bracht et al (2008) find that the compensation mechanism performs very poorly in a public-goods
setting. They find very little evidence of learning. They conjecture that the mechanism is ineﬀective
because it undermines intrinsic motivation for cooperation, and provides only weak incentives as actual
subsidy rates are indeed well below the eﬃcient level.
In our setting, the oﬀer amounts in both the side210 treatment and the side3210 treatment are initially
much lower than predicted. We found some evidence of systematic crowding out but we were not sure
whether the eﬀects are reliable (Figure 10, middle and right panels). In any case, this phenomenon seems
to have a small negative impact on the eﬀectiveness of the mechanism.29
We also considered signaling theory, according to which a choice by the allocator of the largest possible
oﬀer amount is a signal that the allocator intends to split the proceeds of investment— even if this amount
does not change the allocaotor’s best response after investment from keeping to splitting. In treatment
side10, we found strong support for investors’ perceptions of signaling, and for allocators actually signaling
(Table 2, Figure 8 (top left panel) and Figure 12). However, allocators do not choose the oﬀer amout of 1
frequently enough to allow for the perception of signaling (Table 2 and Figure 5 (left panel)), and whenever
allocators choose the oﬀer amount of 0, investors are more reluctant to invest than in the side0 treatment
(Figure 4 (left panel) and Figure 6 (left panel)). Hence, the net eﬀect of the side10 treatment versus the
control treatment side0 is positive but not significant.
29This finding is not surprising as the crowding out eﬀect does usually not emerge when there is no personal relationship
between participants. See Frey (1993) or Bartling, Fehr, and Schmidt (2010).
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6 Conclusion
We considered the compensation mechanism that was applied to the trust game. We saw that the mech-
anism is largely successful at implementing eﬃcient outcomes: when oﬀer amounts of side payments that
should induce investment are possible, allocator participants make such eﬃcient oﬀers 67% of the time;
when eﬃcient oﬀers are received, investor participants respond with cooperation nearly 78% of the time;
participants manage to achieve an eﬃcient outcome— when this is possible — 63% of the time.
We compared the mechanism’s performance in our simple game with the performance in more complex
games reported in previous studies. We conclude that the compensation mechanism is successful if the
setting is simple; indeed, our participants were able to exploit the option to encourage the other player to
play cooperatively, even though they had only a few rounds to gain experience. Nevertheless, even in our
environment— possibly the simplest setting in which to implement the mechanism in an experiment - the
mechanism is not 100% successful. We designed three treatment, side3210, side210, and side10, to find
out what makes the mechanism successful and what makes the mechanism unsuccessful.
In our side3210 treatment with S = {3, 2, 1, 0}, eﬃcient oﬀer amounts of side payments, s = 3 and
s = 2, were possible. Initially, oﬀer amounts were very low. However, allocator participants slowly learned
to make eﬃcient oﬀers. We conclude that allocator participants’ learning to make eﬃcient oﬀer amounts
made the mechanism successful.
In our side210 treatment with S = {2, 1, 0}, initial oﬀers were very low, but allocator participants
slowly learned to make the eﬃcient oﬀer, s = 2. However, even when allocator participants made eﬃcient
oﬀers, investor fairness concerns might have led some investor participants to choose non-cooperation.
Furthermore, when oﬀers were too low to make cooperation rational, a natural tendency to cooperate was
repressed by the introduction of weak incentives. These factors distort the incentives presented by the
mechanism; the overall eﬀect is that the side210 treatment is not eﬀective. This finding is surprising as
we found strong evidence of investor perception of eﬀorts of allocator participants to signal cooperative
intentions in all treatments.
In our side10 treatment with S = {1, 0}, only ineﬃcient oﬀer amounts were possible. Once again,
we found strong evidence of investor perception of signaling, and, in addition, of allocator signaling.
Nevertheless, these behavioral tendencies while strong, are not strong enough to assure eﬀectiveness of the
mechanism when eﬃcient oﬀers are not possible.
We conjecture that a treatment that allows an oﬀer amount of 4 (and an equal split of the returns
following this oﬀer) could highlight allocator discomfort with unequal equilibrium payoﬀs in our side210
and side3210 treatments. This could be an interesting direction for future research.30
30Estelle Midler suggested this modification for future research.
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This appendix contains the instructions for the side0 treatment, the side10 
treatment, the side210 treatment, and the side3210 treatment. The instructions 
for the first half of the treatment are the same.
Instructions—first half of experiment—all treatments
You are about to participate in an experiment in the economics of decision-making. If you 
follow these instructions carefully and make good decisions whenever possible, you might 
earn a considerable amount of money that will be paid to you in cash. If you have a question 
at any time, please feel free to ask me. We ask that you not talk with the other participants 
during the experiment. 
This experimental session is made up of 2 halves. The first half lasts for 5 rounds, and the 
second half lasts for 10 rounds. Each round in the first half consists of one play of a simple 
investment game, which is described below.  Each round of the second half consists of one 
play of a more complicated investment game, which will be described after the first half has 
ended. 
The investment games are played between 2 players, called Investor and Allocator. Before 
the first round begins, each of the participants is randomly assigned one of these roles; half 
will be Investors and half will be Allocators. Participants will remain in the same role 
throughout the experimental session. 
In each round, you will be randomly matched to a player of the opposite role. You will not be 
told the identity of the person you are matched with in any round, nor will they be told your 
identity—even after the end of the session. 
The sequence of play in a round is as follows:
1. The Investor has 2 points and chooses whether to Invest or Not Invest them.
2. If the Investor chooses Not Invest, the round ends, and the Allocator has no 
decision to make.  If the Investor chooses Invest, then the investment is successful, 
yielding 8 points. The Allocator chooses whether to Split these 8 points or Keep 
them; after this, the round ends.
Scoring: 
• If the Investor chooses Not Invest, then the Investor earns 2 points and the Allocator 
earns 0 points. 
• If the Investor chooses Invest, and the Allocator chooses Split, then the Investor 
earns 4 points and the Allocator earns 4 points. 
• If the Investor chooses Invest, and the Allocator chooses Keep, then the Investor 
earns 0 points and the Allocator earns 8 points. 
So, if you are an Investor, your score in each round will depend on your choice and, in some 
cases, the choice of the person you are matched with. If you are an Allocator, your score in 
each round will depend on the choice of the person you are matched with, and, in some cases, 
your choice.
Payments:  At the end of the experimental session, two rounds are chosen randomly: one 
from the first half and one from the second half.  Each participant receives, in Pounds, the 
total number of points he/she earned in those two rounds.  Each participant additionally 
receives £5 for completing the session.  Payments are made in cash at the end of the 
session. 
Instructions—second half of experiment—side0
The procedure in this half of the experiment is very similar to that in the first half. Your role 
will be the same as in the first half. In each round, you will be randomly matched to a player 
of the other role. The only difference is that you are now playing 10 rounds rather than 5. The 
investment game itself is the same as before.
The sequence of play in a round is now as follows:
1. The Investor has 2 points and chooses whether to Invest or Not Invest them.
2. If the Investor chooses Not Invest, the round ends, and the Allocator has no decision 
to make. If the Investor chooses Invest, then the investment is successful, yielding 8 
points. The Allocator chooses whether to Split these 8 points or Keep them; after this, 
the round ends.
Scoring: 
• If the Investor chooses Not Invest, then the Investor earns 2 points and the Allocator 
earns 0 points.
• If the Investor chooses Invest, and the Allocator chooses Split, then the Investor 
earns 4 points and the Allocator earns 4 points.
• If the Investor chooses Invest, and the Allocator chooses Keep, then the Investor 
earns 0 points and the Allocator earns 8 points.
Instructions—second half of experiment—side10
The procedure in this half of the experiment is very similar to that in the first half.  Your role 
will be the same as in the first half.  In each round, you will be randomly matched to a player 
of the other role. The only difference is that the investment game has an additional stage. 
Before the Investor makes a choice, the Allocator can offer a side payment of 1 point to the 
Investor to encourage him/her to Invest.  
Rules of the side payment: 
• If the Investor chooses Invest, the Allocator makes a payment. 
• If the Investor chooses Not Invest, the Allocator does not make a payment to the 
Investor. 
• Making an offer of the side payment is voluntary, but if the Investor chooses Invest, 
paying the side payment is required. 
The sequence of play in a round is now as follows:
1. The Allocator chooses whether to Offer Side Payment or Do Not Offer 
Side Payment. The Investor sees whether the Allocator has chosen Offer Side 
Payment or Do Not Offer Side Payment, then chooses whether to Invest or Not Invest 
the 2 points.
2. If the Investor chooses Not Invest, the round ends, and the Allocator has no further 
decision to make.  If the Investor chooses Invest, then the investment is successful, 
yielding 8 points. The Allocator chooses whether to Split these 8 points or Keep them.
3. If the Allocator chose Offer Side Payment, and the Investor chose Invest, the side 
payment is made from the Allocator to the Investor. If the Allocator chose Do Not 
Offer Side Payment, or if the Investor chose Not Invest, no side payment is made. 
Scoring: 
• If the Investor chooses Not Invest, then the Investor earns 2 points and the Allocator 
earns 0 points (regardless of whether the Allocator chose Offer Side Payment or Do 
Not Offer Side Payment). 
• If the Investor chooses Invest, and the Allocator chooses Keep, then
• the Investor earns 0 points if the Allocator chose Do Not Offer Side Payment, 
• or 1 point if the Allocator chose Offer Side Payment;
• and the Allocator earns 8 points if he/she chose Do Not Offer Side Payment,
• or 7 points if he/she chose Offer Side Payment. 
• If the Investor chooses Invest, and the Allocator chooses Split, then
• the Investor earns 4 points if the Allocator chose Do Not Offer Side Payment,
• or 5 points if the Allocator chose Offer Side Payment;
• and the Allocator earns 4 points if he/she chose Do Not Offer Side Payment,
• or 3 points if he/she chose Offer Side Payment. 
Instructions—second half of experiment—side210
The procedure in this half of the experiment is very similar to that in the first half.  Your role 
will be the same as in the first half.  In each round, you will be randomly matched to a player 
of the other role. The only difference is that the investment game has an additional stage. 
Before the Investor makes a choice, the Allocator can offer a side payment of 1 point or a 
side payment of 2 points to the Investor to encourage him to Invest.  
Rules of the side payment: 
• If the Investor chooses Invest, the Allocator makes a payment. 
• If the Investor chooses Not Invest, the Allocator does not make a payment to the
Investor.
• Making an offer of the side payment is voluntary, but if the Investor chooses Invest, 
paying the side payment is required. 
The sequence of play in a round is now as follows. 
1. The Allocator chooses whether to Offer Side Payment or Do Not Offer 
Side Payment. The Investor sees whether the Allocator has chosen Offer Side 
Payment or No Offer Side Payment, then chooses whether to Invest or Not Invest the 2 
points.
2. If the Investor chooses Not Invest, the round ends, and the Allocator has no further 
decision to make.  If the Investor chooses Invest, then the investment is successful, 
yielding 8 points. The Allocator chooses whether to Split these 8 points or Keep them.
3. If the Allocator chose Offer Side Payment, and the Investor chose Invest, the side 
payment is made from the Allocator to the Investor. If the Allocator chose Do Not 
Offer Side Payment, or if the Investor chose Not Invest, no side payment is made.
Scoring: 
• If the Investor chooses Not Invest, then the Investor earns 2 points and the Allocator 
earns 0 points (regardless of whether the Allocator chose Offer Side Payment or Do 
Not Offer Side Payment). 
• If the Investor chooses Invest, and the Allocator chooses Keep, then
• the Investor earns 0 points if the Allocator chose Do Not Offer Side Payment,
• or 1 point if the Allocator chose Offer Side Payment 1,
• or 2 points if the Allocator chose Offer Side Payment 2;
• and the Allocator earns 8 points if he/she chose Do Not Offer Side Payment,
• or 7 points if he/she chose Offer Side Payment 1,
• or 6 points if he/she chose Offer Side Payment 2. 
• If the Investor chooses Invest, and the Allocator chooses Split,
• then the Investor earns 4 points if the Allocator chose Do Not Offer Side 
Payment,
• or 5 points if the Allocator chose Offer Side Payment 1,
• or 6 points if the Allocator chose Offer Side Payment 2;
• and the Allocator earns 4 points if he/she chose Do Not Offer Side Payment,
• or 3 points if he/she chose Offer Side Payment 1, 
• or 2 points if he/she chose Offer Side Payment 2. 
Instructions—second half of experiment—side3210
The procedure in this half of the experiment is very similar to that in the first half.  Your role 
will be the same as in the first half.  In each round, you will be randomly matched to a player 
of the other role. The only difference is that the investment game has an additional stage. 
Before the Investor makes a choice, the Allocator can offer a side payment of 1 point, of 2 
points, or of 3 points to the Investor to encourage him/her to Invest.  
Rules of the side payment: 
• If the Investor chooses Not Invest, the Allocator does not make a payment to the 
Investor.
• If the Investor chooses Invest, the Allocator makes a payment. 
• Making an offer of the side payment is voluntary, but if the Investor chooses Invest, 
paying the side payment is required. 
The sequence of play in a round is now as follows. 
1. The Allocator chooses whether to Offer Side Payment or Do Not Offer 
Side Payment. The Investor sees whether the Allocator has chosen Offer Side 
Payment or Do Not Offer Side Payment, then chooses whether to Invest or Not Invest 
the 2 points.
2. If the Investor chooses Not Invest, the round ends, and the Allocator has no further 
decision to make.  If the Investor chooses Invest, then the investment is successful, 
yielding 8 points. The Allocator chooses whether to Split these 8 points or Keep them.
3. If the Allocator chose Offer Side Payment, and the Investor chose Invest, the side 
payment is made from the Allocator to the Investor. If the Allocator chose Do Not 
Offer Side Payment, or if the Investor chose Not Invest, no side payment is made.
Scoring: 
• If the Investor chooses Not Invest, then the Investor earns 2 points and the Allocator 
earns 0 points (regardless of whether the Allocator chose Offer Side Payment or Do 
Not Offer Side Payment). 
• If the Investor chooses Invest, and the Allocator chooses Keep, then
• the Investor earns 0 points if the Allocator chose Do Not Offer Side Payment,
• or 1 point if the Allocator chose Offer Side Payment 1,
• or 2 points if the Allocator chose Offer Side Payment 2,
• or 3 points of the Allocator chose Offer Side Payment 3;
• and the Allocator earns 8 points if he/she chose Do Not Offer Side Payment,
• or 7 points if he/she chose Offer Side Payment 1,
• or 6 points if he/she chose Offer Side Payment 2,
• or 5 points if he/she chose Offer Side Payment 3.. 
• If the Investor chooses Invest, and the Allocator chooses Split,
• then the Investor earns 4 points if the Allocator chose Do Not Offer Side 
Payment,
• or 5 points if the Allocator chose Offer Side Payment 1,
• or 6 points if the Allocator chose Offer Side Payment 2
• or 7 points if the Allocator chose Offer Side Payment 3;
• and the Allocator earns 4 points if he/she chose Do Not Offer Side Payment,
• or 3 points if he/she chose Offer side Payment 1, 
• or 2 points if he/she chose Offer side Payment 2,
• or 1 points if he/she chose Offer side Payment 3. 
